PNNL

Abstract

As electricity markets begin to shift from reliance on large, centralized power plants and towards distributed energy resources (DERs), there is a growing acknowledgement that more efficient planning, operations, and oversight is needed in the distribution system. This paper addresses one step in that direction by proposing an auction mechanism that uses a detailed distribution system planning model that allocates permits to end-used customers who request capacity to install new devices at their location and network upgrade contracts to utilities or 3rd-party companies who offer to upgrade system components. The resulting plan maximizes market surplus, that is, maximizes the total benefit to consumers minus the cost of network upgrades. We apply a marginal pricing scheme to the auction’s results such that the cost of each permits or contracts is differentiated by time and location, based on the Lagrangian multipliers of binding network constraints. These prices are shown to be no greater than the bid price of any awarded contract and no less than the offered cost of any awarded upgrade contract. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of power flows in the planning model result in an additional surplus that would be collected by the entity that hosts the auction, which could then be refunded to market participants or used to cover overhead costs of running the market. We provide four example auction results in a simple three-node distribution feeder to demonstrate the properties of the design. Results suggest that larger or more realistic case studies could be a promising next step.