Developments surrounding the recent arrest and subsequent release of a former Soviet KGB officer have reinforced existing security concerns facing Department of Energy (DOE) travelers to Russia and other states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). DOE and contractors traveling to Russia and the FSU face the potential risk of being targeted for intelligence collection/exploitation, detainment and/or harassment by host country intelligence and security personnel. This concern is especially acute for DOE and contractor personnel with previous careers in intelligence-related disciplines within the US armed forces or other government agencies, toward whom the Russian or other FSU intelligence and security services may devote special attention.

According to press reports, on October 29, 1996, retired KGB Colonel Vladimir Galkin was detained at Kennedy International Airport in New York City by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of espionage. The warrant for Galkin's arrest charged that during a 1991 meeting in Cypress, he paid a $30,000 bribe to an American computer scientist in exchange for classified national security information, including data relating to ballistic missile defense. The scientist, Subrahmanyam Kota, who later was implicated in a separate incident of industrial espionage in the US, reportedly implicated Galkin.

Galkin's arrest was angrily denounced by Russian Government officials, who said the incident could seriously damage Russian-US relations and demanded his immediate release. They claimed Galkin had retired from government service, no longer was involved in intelligence collection activities, freely admitted his past association with the KGB on his visa application, and was traveling to the US in connection with legitimate business activities on behalf of a Russian American company called Knowledge Express.

Galkin reportedly planned to attend a trade show in New Jersey to purchase law enforcement surveillance equipment.

Official Russian statements included explicit threats by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service of "tangible" reprisals against former US intelligence personnel traveling to Russia on business. It also was alleged that the US had broken the "unwritten rules" of espionage by targeting a retired intelligence officer and for jailing an alleged spy instead of simply deporting him.

Charges against Galkin were dropped on November 14 following an extensive flurry of publicity surrounding the case and a determination by US officials that continued pursuit of the case was not in the national interest.

This event demonstrates a continued need to ensure that DOE and contractor employees remain aware of security concerns when traveling to foreign countries. Travelers must be aware that an "incident" such as this could directly or indirectly impact them.

Large numbers of DOE personnel travel regularly to Russia and the FSU in connection with ongoing nuclear safety and safeguards and security work. This includes work conducted under both bilateral and multilateral agreements. Should relations between the US and Russia suddenly (evenly temporarily) decline, for example, acts of retribution or harassment could be directed against them. In addition, some elements of the Russian or other FSU intelligence and security services may harbor suspicions about DOE travelers, perceiving them to be involved in US intelligence collection activities. This is especially true of those DOE travelers with prior careers in intelligence-related disciplines in the US armed forces, about whom such suspicions may be particularly acute. Finally, the Russian interpretation of what constitutes a "state secret" or "spying" can be very broad and subject to change. There may be those throughout the intelligence or security services who feel that cooperating with US Government representatives (such as DOE personnel) in areas related to nuclear materials and safeguards and security issues borders on damaging their own national security interests. This could result in detrimental actions directed against DOE or contractor personnel.

As noted through ongoing Department counterintelligence reporting, the threat of intelligence targeting, collection, and exploitation activities directed against DOE travelers to Russia and the FSU has not declined in the post Cold War era. This threat has become more complex, as a greater number of foreign intelligence and security service actors are now involved and there is a growing focus on sensitive and unclassified science and technology information with commercial application, in addition to the traditional targeting of classified defense and national security information.

As a result, travelers must remain aware that intelligence activities can involve the targeting of DOE or contractor travelers regardless of whether or not they maintain a security clearance or work on classified projects. Further, individual DOE travelers must understand that large-scale and sophisticated foreign intelligence service collection activities may entail obtaining small pieces of information from many different sources which on their own may seem harmless, but when combined provide valuable insight into sensitive programs or activities.

In light of recent threats and other angry statements purported to have been communicated by Russian intelligence, security professionals across the DOE Complex must work diligently through security education, awareness, and foreign travel briefings/debriefings to ensure that all DOE and contractor personnel are aware of the complex array of threats, risks, and related security concerns that coincide with the Department's growing interactions with Russia and other FSU states.

Security and Privacy Notice
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Last Updated October 2001