Evidence persists in the post Cold War era that Russian intelligence operations continue to target US industry and government, including the Department of Energy. According to published reports, Russian intelligence activities not only include the traditional targeting of classified diplomatic, defense, and related national security information, but increasingly are focused upon sensitive, proprietary, and other unclassified information relating to science and technology issues, including those with commercial applications. Increasing interaction between Department of Energy (DOE) personnel and representatives of Russian government and commercial enterprises have enhanced opportunities for intelligence collection and exploitation activities. Department scientists and others involved in ongoing nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards and security programs with Russia represent particularly attractive targets for intelligence exploitation activities, including those personnel who may be known to the Russian intelligence services by virtue of actual or suspected service in intelligence related fields within the US armed forces.

Unclassified reporting by the US intelligence community and published accounts from the news media and other sources indicate that successor organizations to the Soviet intelligence apparatus such as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), military intelligence service (GRU), and internal Federal Security Service (FSB) continue to operate against American targets. The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) reported in February 1996 that President Boris Yeltsin confirmed Russia was engaged in industrial espionage directed against Western technology, while an August 1996 NACIC report stated that Russia's evolving intelligence goals include collections directed against weapons design technologies; aviation, space, and other technologies with commercial application; and transnational corporations including banking, investment, and other financial firms. NACIC also noted that increased cooperation is being sought between the Russian intelligence services and Russian private sector enterprises, while a November 1996 National Security Institute report stated that a reorganization of the Russian intelligence services, currently under consideration, would further increase targeting and collection of economic, scientific, and technical information in the US and Western Europe.

Personnel and programs associated with the Department of Energy constitute attractive targets for intelligence collection because of the Department's involvement in defense and other national security matters of interest to the Russian Federation. Additional collections are thought to be directed against the Department's extensive laboratory system, where cutting edge scientific research is of substantial interest, particularly R&D activities with potential commercial application. The latter case is indicative of changing overall international conditions, where competition among states (both friendly and adversarial) is increasingly focused on economic and industrial matters.

One indicator of ongoing Russian intelligence activity can be found in the March 1996 Trends in Intellectual Property Loss Survey sponsored by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). This study identified five incidents of intellectual property theft against US companies operating in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States between 1993 and the first half of 1995. While the details of specific intelligence operations mounted against DOE personnel and assets cannot be discussed in detail here, there have been reported incidents involving apparent cultivation of personnel via e-mail and Internet "chat" exchanges, elicitation efforts at conferences and meetings, apparent technical surveillance measures against travelers to Russia, and circumstances overseas where entrapment attempts may have been mounted.

Official interactions between Department personnel and Russian representatives are growing rapidly. Foreign travel to Russia (or other locations) provides ample opportunity for intelligence exploitation. The National Counterintelligence Center has reported that counterintelligence personnel in Russia are known to target American visitors, and are likely to use the traveler's Russian contacts to collect information on them. The NACIC warns travelers to "expect that Russian businessmen, scientists, and interpreters...could be intelligence officers" and that the Russian intelligence services increasingly make use of commercial cover to collect information in the high-technology and defense fields. Russian intelligence officers are placed throughout government organizations, and may seek to gain information about sensitive or proprietary research and development programs. This includes other projects outside the scope of work between the traveler and his Russian counterparts. The NACIC also reports that all Russian employees of American enterprises should be assumed to be reporting to the Russian intelligence services and that fax, e-mail, and telephone traffic from inside Russia is frequently monitored.

It is important to note that the Russian interpretation of what constitutes "spying" and their definition of what may be considered to be a "state secret" can be very broad and subject to change. This, coupled with reports of aggressive behavior by Russian counterintelligence officials, and a July 1995 law granting the FSB greater authority to conduct physical and technical surveillance, recruit informers, conduct searches, and hold suspects in pretrial detention, could result in the targeting or harassment of Department travelers suspected of involvement in US intelligence activities. This concern is particularly relevant for those Department personnel with former military service, about whom suspicions may be high.

Foreign visits and assignments to Department facilities also are thought to be exploited by the Russian intelligence services. While only a small percentage of Russian visitors may actually be intelligence officers, scientists, students, technicians, etc can be coopted to perform intelligence activities while visiting Department facilities. Some such persons may engage in actual collection activity, but equally valuable is spotting (and to some degree vetting) Department personnel involved with research or other work of interest to the Russian intelligence services. These DOE personnel may then be pursued under more optimal circumstances, such as an overseas trip. Longer term foreign visitors to DOE facilities frequently become institutionalized, accepted, and implicitly trusted after a period of time by their American hosts, and thus may more easily pick up valuable information about the facility they are visiting. Additionally, they are in a useful position to collect targeting information (marital status, social life, financial situation, hobbies, vices, etc.) concerning specific individuals that appear to be vulnerable or otherwise attractive as a target of exploitation.

Efforts must continue to identify, monitor and adequately protect scientific and technical R&D across the complex which involve either mature or developing technologies of a sensitive nature that are of interest to foreign countries. In this context, maintaining and constantly updating our collective knowledge about those technologies that currently or may in the future fall under either the Militarily Critical Technologies List or the National Critical Technologies List is important.

Security professionals across the DOE Complex should also remain aware of those aspects of foreign intelligence targeting and collection activities that are undergoing change or modification. For example, the proliferation of information technology like the Internet has made it easier for foreign intelligence services to collect open source information, making information security and operations security both more complicated and demanding. Likewise, surreptitious collection activities may also make use of information technologies, such as electronic intrusion into automated information systems (either remotely or from inside a facility). Greater interaction between US and Russian personnel through foreign travel and visits and assignments enhances the opportunities for information collection, elicitation efforts, or spotting and vetting of potential sources. At the same time, this does not mean that the more traditional intelligence collection methodologies such as ethnic targeting or technical surveillance should be overlooked.

Interaction between DOE and Russian personnel helps facilitate important US goals, such as improving nuclear safeguards and security measures throughout Russia and other former Soviet republics, thereby helping to reduce the risk of nuclear materials diversion and associated proliferation concerns. However, this growing relationship also entails risks concerning our vulnerability to intelligence exploitation which needs to be recognized and adequately mitigated against. Understanding these risks and the associated intelligence collection threats which drive them provides us with a solid foundation on which to implement essential DOE security policies and practices.

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Last Updated October 2001