

**GTSP**



Global Energy Technology  
Strategy Program

# The History of the Future Price of Oil

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Joint Global Change Research Institute

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**PNNL-SA-60763**

**Battelle**



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

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

# Climate change is a long-term strategic problem with implications for today

- ▶ Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and not their annual emissions levels should be the overarching strategic goal of climate policy.
- ▶ This tells us that a fixed and finite amount of CO<sub>2</sub> can be released to the atmosphere over the course of this century.
  - We all share a planetary greenhouse gas emissions budget.
  - Every ton of emissions released to the atmosphere reduces the budget left for future generations.
  - As we move forward in time and this planetary emissions budget is drawn down, the remaining allowable emissions will become more valuable.
  - Emissions permit prices should steadily rise with time.





# Stabilization of CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations means fundamental change to the global energy system




- Oil
- Natural Gas
- Coal
- Biomass Energy
- Non-Biomass Renewable Energy

- ▨ Oil + CCS
- ▨ Natural Gas + CCS
- ▨ Coal + CCS
- Nuclear Energy
- End-use Energy



# CCS Deployment by Electric Utilities


## IGCC+CCS and Nuclear Are Keys to Decarbonizing Baseload Power



▶ In 2005, conventional fossil-fired power plants were the predominant means of generating competitively priced electricity.

▶ However, given today's and (likely) tomorrow's higher natural gas prices and the imposition of a hypothetical binding greenhouse gas control policy,

- While renewables are likely to grow substantially, IGCC+CCS and nuclear become -- in some regions of the U.S. -- the dominant means of generating low-carbon *baseload* electricity.



# Two Core Principals for Good Guide Climate Policy (Edmonds, 1999)

## Credible Commitment


There needs to be a credible expectation that the future energy regime will be different than the past. Technology maturation cycles are significantly longer than political cycles, the Commitment must be binding and transcend multiple political cycles for non-carbon energy technologies to have a chance of achieving significant market penetration.

## Means of Controlling Real Costs

There needs to be a credible expectation that the cost of implementing a commitment will not be too onerous. If sticking with the Commitment is too painful (costly), it will ultimately implode.




# US Oil Prices 1861-2008






# U.S. Oil Prices 1969-2008






# History of Oil Price Projections and Actual Oil Price (real 2005 US\$)



- ◆ Resources in America's Future (RFF 1962)
- ▲ Baughman Free Flowing Imports Scenario (Feb 1973)
- ◆ IEW (December 1981)
- ◆ High Cost Scenario: Energy in a Finite World (1981)
- ◆ Yergin & Hillenbrand (1982) High Price
- ◆ AEO 1983
- ◆ AEO 1984
- ◆ AEO 1986
- ◆ IEW (January 1987)
- ◆ Long Range Projections: Reference Case (DOE 1988)
- ◆ AEO 1989
- ◆ AEO 1990
- ◆ AEO 1992
- ◆ AEO 1993
- ◆ AEO 1994
- ◆ IEW (January 1996)
- ◆ AEO 1997
- ◆ AEO 1999
- ◆ AEO 2001
- ◆ AEO 2003
- ◆ AEO 2005
- ◆ Actual
- ◆ Steele (Feb 1973)
- ◆ Baughman Restricted Imports Scenario (Feb 1973)
- ◆ Low Cost Scenario: Energy in a Finite World (1981)
- ◆ Yergin & Hillenbrand (1982) Low Price
- ◆ AEO 1982
- ◆ IEW (July 1984)
- ◆ AEO 1985
- ◆ AEO 1987
- ◆ Long Range Projections: Low Energy Efficiency Case (DOE 1988)
- ◆ Long Range Projections: High Energy Efficiency Case (DOE 1988)
- ◆ IEW (January 1990)
- ◆ AEO 1991
- ◆ GRI 1992
- ◆ IEW (January 1993)
- ◆ AEO 1995
- ◆ AEO 1996
- ◆ AEO 1998
- ◆ AEO 2000
- ◆ AEO 2002
- ◆ AEO 2004
- ◆ AEO 2006




# Oil Prices and Projections Pre-1973 Arab Oil Embargo (real 2005 US\$)




# Expectations and Incentives Matter: Pre-1973 Arab Oil Embargo

**Federal Energy R&D  
Investments (1961-2008)**




Federal investments in energy R&D were stable or in decline and were overwhelmingly focused on nuclear power.

**U.S. Oil-fired Electric Generation  
Investments (1950-2007)**



The electric utility sector was rapidly expanding its use of (cheap) petroleum.


# Oil Prices and Projections Made Between the Major Oil Disruptions of the 1970s (real 2005 US\$)





# Expectations and Incentives Matter: Between the Major Oil Disruptions of the 1970s


**Federal Energy R&D Investments (1961-2008)**




Federal and private sector investments in energy grew dramatically and became a more well rounded portfolio of activities.

Electric utilities quickly reversed course and rapidly decreased their use of petroleum.

**U.S. Oil-fired Electric Generation Investments (1950-2007)**




**Major US Oil and Gas Companies Investments in Energy R&D (1961-2008)**






# Oil Prices and Projections 1980s (real 2005 US\$)






# Expectations and Incentives Matter: The 1980s

## Federal Energy R&D Investments (1961-2008)




## U.S. Venture Capital Investments in Energy 1980-2007





As time passed and the oil disruptions of the 1970s faded into memory, the less priority was accorded to investments in new energy technologies.

## Major US Oil and Gas Companies Investments in Energy R&D (1961-2008)



# Expectations and Incentives Matter: The 1980s

3,900 miles of CO<sub>2</sub> pipeline built to date





>60% of this was built in the 1980s

>50% was built in and around West Texas in the 1980s




# Expectations and Incentives Matter: The 1980s



- ▶ Most of the existing CO<sub>2</sub> pipeline infrastructure was built during a period of rapidly declining oil prices.
- ▶ This was in part due to the fact that the federal government was sending a clear signal that it would support domestic oil production and that this support would not be short-lived:
  - During the relatively short period 1980-1985, major U.S. oil companies paid over \$88.5 billion in Windfall Profits Taxes to the U.S. Government.
- ▶ It was also due to the fact that there was a widely held belief that oil prices would begin to increase in the near future.


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


# Expectations and Incentives Matter: The 1990s

### Federal Energy R&D Investments (1961-2008)




### U.S. Venture Capital Investments in Energy 1980-2007




As time passed and the oil disruptions of the 1970s faded into memory, the less priority was accorded to investments in new energy technologies.

### Major US Oil and Gas Companies Investments in Energy R&D (1961-2008)




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


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


CO<sub>2</sub>-driven EOR on the upswing.

More venture capital is being devoted to “energy” investments.




## U.S. Venture Capital Investments in Energy 1980-2007





# History of Oil Price Projections and Actual Oil Price (real 2005 US\$)



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# The Recent History of World Oil Prices in Local Currencies

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
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


# Selected Currency Exchange Rates 2002-2008






# World Oil Prices 2002-2008 Expressed in Local Currencies





# World Oil Prices in Local Currency Jan 2002=1




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





# Back-up Slides



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


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





# Major US Oil and Gas Companies Investments in Energy R&D (1961-2008)



# U.S. Venture Capital Investments in Energy 1980-2007



# Number of U.S. CO<sub>2</sub> EOR Floods 1971-2008



# Domestic U.S. CO<sub>2</sub> EOR Oil Production 1971-2008

